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rom the time of its publication in 1945, By Grand Central 
Station I Sat Down and Wept has been read as the true confes-
sion of its author, Elizabeth Smart. One of the earliest reviews of 
Smart’s “curious outpourings” criticized the fact that “actual incidents 
were washed away in a f lood of self-revealing comment and analysis” 
(qtd. in Sullivan 228). Smart’s mother, likewise mistaking the book for 
autobiography, attempted to destroy what she perceived as the scan-
dalous evidence of her daughter’s “erotomania” (qtd. in Sullivan 229). 
These autobiographical assumptions, though misguided, nevertheless 
have both a textual and a social basis. First, they are occasioned by 
the use of an intimate first-person address delivered by an unnamed 
narrator who resembles the author. Second, they can be attributed to a 
culture of confession that, as Michel Foucault argues, constantly exerts 
pressure “to constitute oneself as an object of knowledge both for other 
people and for oneself” (Politics 151). What is particularly ironic about 
the autobiographical readings of By Grand Central Station, however, is 
that the novel formally and thematically resists the demand for disclo-
sure. The first section of this paper focuses on Smart’s formal obstruc-
tions, which include practices of self-fictionalization, metatextuality, 
and paratextual ambiguity. The second section shifts to confessional 
discourse in the novel itself, which I argue produces pleasure rather 
than what Foucault calls “knowledge-power” (History 58). By discon-
necting her statements from empirical reality, referring them instead to 
a metaphorical structure in which “love has other laws” (Grand Central 
Station 84), the narrator challenges the social and legal condemnation 
of her extramarital relationship. She simultaneously performs an elabo-
rate “rhetorical seduction” of the reader (Felman 29), persuading her to 
suspend her moral judgment and likewise embrace the celebration of 
erotic love.
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Ambiguous Confessions
Although much attention has been devoted to the mutual implication 
of Smart and her narrator in illicit love affairs, few critics have noticed 
a more important point of convergence between them: namely, their 
shared resistance to the coercive power of what Robert McGill calls the 
“confessional matrix” (70). While McGill makes only passing reference 
to Foucault, his description of the “demand for self-disclosure” faced by 
Smart and other writers is illuminated by Foucault’s critique of confes-
sional culture (McGill 68). Foucault argues that confessional discourse 
occupies a central place in all social institutions, including “justice, 
medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, . . . the 
most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and . . . the most solemn rites” 
(History 59). Although confession has been canonized as the privileged 
vehicle for expressing truth, its primary function is in fact to shore 
up repressive social mores; Foucault traces its origin to the medieval 
Inquisition, notorious for eliciting confessions of heresy through torture 
(58). Over the centuries, these police tactics have become incorporated 
into our psyches: today the cultural imperative to confess is so strong 
that, far from requiring torture devices to elicit it, we perceive it not as 
a constraint but as the basic precondition of our being. The problem, 
however, is that confessions construct the truths that they purportedly 
reveal, in the process producing “knowledge-power” (58). Beyond fab-
ricating knowledge, confessions enforce the social norms that govern 
which subject positions are acceptable within a determinate moral code: 
the “truth” that the subject confesses is therefore determined by her 
awareness of the mores to which she is expected to conform.
The disciplinary underpinnings of confession are revealed in the 
reaction of Smart’s mother, Louie, to what she perceived as By Grand 
Central Station’s moral degeneracy: upon its publication, she immedi-
ately bought the six available copies in an Ottawa dry goods store and 
promptly burned them. She also petitioned the Department of External 
Affairs to prevent the book’s importation into Canada (Sullivan 229). 
Although Louie Smart was mistaken in her assumption that the book 
is autobiographical, her extreme actions display both the normative 
framework in which confessional writing operates and her perception 
of her daughter’s failure to conform to social standards. Her reaction, 
however, was not only misguided but also deeply ironic given Smart’s 
overt challenge to the “knowledge-power” engendered by confessional 
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discourse. Confession is both the rhetorical mode and a major plot point 
of By Grand Central Station, whose climactic scene involves the border 
police’s attempt to make the narrator admit that she has committed 
adultery; nevertheless, the desire for a “true” confession is consistently 
thwarted by strategies of obfuscation that both Smart and her narrator 
employ to resist the demand for self-disclosure.
One strategy that Smart adopts is to blur the line between fact and 
fiction such that the confessional act becomes unmoored from its empir-
ical referent. In By Grand Central Station, she piques the reader’s “bio-
graphical desire — the desire to treat a literary text as a way of coming 
to know its author — ” by framing the narrative as an intimate first-
person address (McGill 67). Smart thereby appeals to the privileged 
status of confessional discourse in Western culture as “a prime mark 
of authenticity, par excellence the kind of speech in which the indi-
vidual authenticates his inner truth” (Brooks 4). Beyond merely com-
municating information, confession has the performative function of 
elevating the subject’s narrative to the status of truth claim.1 The stakes 
of this performative power are clearest in “institutional” confessions 
(Bok 88) — for example, those that a person makes in the police sta-
tion — where a statement is transmuted into a fact that can be used to 
adjudicate a legal case. The same power attends confessional discourse 
in a non-institutional context, where the act of confessing transforms 
the speaker’s inner experience into a form of outward “truth.” As “a type 
of autobiographical writing which signals its intention to foreground 
the most personal and intimate details of the author’s life,” confession 
is a particularly privileged genre in women’s writing, in which, as Rita 
Felski affirms, “feminist confession continually refers to the question 
of truth as its ultimate legitimation” (83, 100).
This truth effect is arguably heightened by the fact that many of the 
novel’s details bear striking similarities to Smart’s biography; although 
the characters are unnamed, or, in the case of minor characters such 
as the Wurtles, given fictional names, geographical locations remain 
unchanged, as do biographical details, such as the couple’s arrest at the 
American border. The novel is also formally tied to its author because 
of its partial origin in her personal diary: her notebooks contain letters, 
poems, and annotations by both her and George Barker, her lover, as 
well as “recipes and beginning drafts of By Grand Central Station I Sat 
Down and Wept” (Alice van Wart, qtd. in Smart, Necessary Secrets 247). 
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The narrator’s justification for her affair — namely, that “love has other 
laws” — originates in a diary entry from 17 December 1940, in which 
Smart laments her lover’s return to his wife, Jessica:
He did the one sin love won’t allow. The FBI, Mummy, Witchie, 
the Montreal Police, and Hull were powerless, but love has other 
laws and a slight trespass is punished without trial.2 George did sin 
here, and though he says it was in pity’s name and that pity was 
only fighting a losing battle with love, he was useless to pity and in 
wavering injured love which was, after all what he had staked all 
for, all he had, ungamblable. (Necessary Secrets 254)
This passage reappears in By Grand Central Station in a slightly modi-
fied form:
 He did the one sin which Love will not allow. The police, 
domestic scenes, cooling friends, the bribed provincial cops, the 
sordidness of hotels, were powerless, but love has other laws, whose 
infringement, even by a slight trespass, is punished without trial.
 He did sin against love, and even though he says it was in Pity’s 
name, and that Pity was only fighting a losing battle with Love, he 
was useless to Pity, and in wavering, injured Love, which was, after 
all, what he staked all for, all he had, ungamblable. (84)
Also excised from the novel is Barker’s response to the passage cited 
above, which Barker scribbled in the margins of Smart’s diary: “I did 
bloody well not. GB” (Necessary Secrets 255). Smart’s erasure of names 
and other autobiographical details, complemented by her elevation of 
the personified Love and Pity to the status of proper nouns, has the 
effect of expanding her personal narrative to heroic dimensions; Smart 
spent three years revising the manuscript of By Grand Central Station, 
“working over passages again and again to tighten up their metaphorical 
structure” (van Wart, qtd. in Smart, Autobiographies 71). Yet the changes 
that she did not make are also important: in this excerpt, her imagery 
and use of personification remain almost identical in the journal and 
the published text, complicating the divide between fact and fiction.
Another way that Smart blurs these lines in By Grand Central Station 
is through metatextuality. Although Barker’s words are excised from the 
passage cited above, they are in fact recorded elsewhere in the novel. 
Anne Quéma has argued that, in at least one passage, the narrator is 
in direct dialogue with criticisms that Barker made of an early draft 
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of the manuscript. She points us to the narrator’s interrogation of the 
phrase “minor martyrdoms,” which appears in Barker’s critique (Smart, 
Autobiographies 71): “Why does he write ‘minor’ martyrdoms? Didn’t 
the crucifixion only last three days? Is it the shortness of the days of 
torture or the fact that hope still breathes that lets him say minor? How 
can anything so total not be major?” (Grand Central Station 86). Quéma 
reads this passage as Smart’s direct response to Barker’s criticism that 
the novel lacked depth and rightly argues that the leaping of diegetic 
registers thereby “transforms her writing into a dialogical and agonistic 
performance” (305). This metatextuality confirms that the ambiguous 
relationship between author and narrator is not merely a by-product of 
Smart’s idiosyncratic compositional process, as Dee Horne maintains 
it is in her treatment of the book as a “novel-journal”; rather, Smart’s 
simultaneous evocation and thwarting of biographical desire know-
ingly challenges the “moral obligation . . . to know oneself, to tell the 
truth about oneself and to constitute oneself as an object of knowledge 
both for other people and for oneself” (Foucault, Politics 151). By Grand 
Central Station resists perpetuating the disciplinary norms enforced, as 
Foucault argues, through self-revelation, by leveraging the authenticat-
ing power of confession against the production of knowledge that it is 
usually meant to facilitate.
Smart’s multiple, conflicting accounts of the origins of By Grand 
Central Station can likewise be seen as resisting the demands of con-
fessional culture; in his thorough discussion of its popular reception, 
McGill details how Smart alternatively emphasized biographical ele-
ments to generate interest and minimized them when they threatened 
to overshadow the autonomy of her artistic creation. She was the first 
person, in fact, to make autobiographical insinuations: in 1966, on 
the occasion of Panther’s publication of a second edition of By Grand 
Central Station, the Evening Standard quoted her as saying, “I sat down 
by Grand Central Station for a whole day crying and writing the novel” 
(qtd. in McGill 72).3 Smart also capitalized on the public’s interest in 
her relationship with Barker by appearing alongside him at literary 
events and speaking openly of their affair (McGill 75). As the bio-
graphical reading gained traction in the public imagination, however, 
Smart increasingly downplayed the novel’s referential status: among 
other examples, McGill cites a 1977 interview in which she claimed 
that “they’ve made far too much of the autobiography” and describes 
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her “horrified” reaction to a screenplay of By Grand Central Station that 
gave the names Elizabeth and George to the book’s unnamed protago-
nists (75-76). Viewed in the context of Foucault’s critique, Smart’s pro-
ject becomes more than just a “flirtation” with her audience, as McGill 
puts it; Smart does not merely titillate the reader’s desire for ontological 
closure but also, more radically, takes aim at the cultural mechanism 
that perpetuates this desire and regulates what can be disclosed (70).
The stakes of Smart’s practice become clear in the climactic scene 
at the Arizona border, when the narrator and her lover are arrested for 
committing adultery; it is not a stretch to suggest that this scene micro-
cosmically embodies the same wariness of confession that informs her 
autobiographical ambiguity. As Peter Brooks observes, in the juridical 
scenario, “confessions rarely are products of a free and rational will. 
They arise in situations of constraint, whether physical or psychological” 
(63). Instead of capitulating to the officer’s interrogation, however, the 
narrator empowers herself by responding with lines from the Song of 
Solomon:
 What relation is this man to you? (My beloved is mine and I am 
his: he feedeth among the lilies.)
 How long have you known him? (I am my beloved’s and my 
beloved is mine: he feedeth among the lilies.)
 Did you sleep in the same room? (Behold thou art fair, my love, 
behold thou art fair: thou hast dove’s eyes). . . . (Grand Central 
Station 47)
The police are “representatives of a culture that demands strictly ref-
erential confession” (McGill 81), a culture, moreover, in which social 
mores are enshrined in law. The brutality of this extorted confession 
is embodied in the juxtaposition of the interrogator’s questions, with 
their harsh, pared-down sentences, against the f lowing lyricism and 
imagism of the Song of Solomon. Whereas the officer wants the narra-
tor to admit that she is guilty, she refuses to define her relationship as 
either a moral or a legal transgression. And, though the police officer 
cannot make sense of her responses, their seeming incommensurability, 
for the reader, is a fully intelligible articulation of her protest against 
the normative underpinning of society and its laws: they represent her 
refusal to temper the heroic terms of her love into “a reductively literal 
view of the world” (McGill 80). When the narrator is accused of hav-
ing “antagonized” the border guards by the family friend into whose 
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care she is released (Grand Central Station 51), she protests, “‘But they 
brought in the nature of Truth’” (52); her definition of the truth must 
be juxtaposed with “[t]he truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth” forcibly extracted from her by the border guards (49). In her 
lexicon, the subjective truth of erotic love is more legitimate than the 
institutional discourses that police sexual expression.
This scene functions as an object lesson regarding the insidious alli-
ance between confession and the enforcement of sexual norms, which 
Foucault argues has inhered in Western culture since the nineteenth 
century (History 54). Sex, he maintains, has been transformed into a 
science, a “scientia sexualis,” through its codification and regulation by 
institutional discourses. By Grand Central Station’s interrogation scene 
demonstrates how sex, “the privileged theme of confession,” is policed 
through disclosure (which Foucault argues can be either voluntary or, as 
we see here, forced) (History 61, 59). The scientific discourse surround-
ing sexuality is the paradigmatic example of the production of know-
ledge-power insofar as sex thus codified can be adjudicated according to 
empirical criteria (e.g., healthy versus unhealthy, correct versus deviant). 
Foucault contrasts this instrumental approach to sexuality with the ars 
erotica practised by other cultures throughout history:4 
In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as 
a practice and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered 
in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, 
nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in 
relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of 
its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in 
the body and the soul. (History 57)
Sex understood as pleasure, in his assessment, is the antidote to the 
clinicized discourse allied with knowledge-power. In the literary con-
text, a similar insight underlies the écriture feminine practised by Hélène 
Cixous and other feminist practitioners to inscribe women’s jouissance 
into a linguistic system that excludes female sexual experience. Denise 
Adele Heaps has argued that Smart and Cixous are “kindred spirits” 
insofar as their writing shares a number of ideological and discursive fea-
tures, particularly the articulation of “libidinal” femininity (145). Heaps 
concludes her article, however, by registering her ambivalence toward 
Cixous, who has been accused by several prominent feminist critics, 
including Toril Moi, Morag Shiach, and Domna Stanton, of promoting 
52 Scl/Élc
an essentialized view of woman. These critics argue that Cixous at times 
portrays woman as a particular type of embodied subject rather than the 
multiple and irreducible heterogeneity suggested elsewhere in her own 
writing. Like Heaps, I also aim to demonstrate that the rhetoric of By 
Grand Central Station serves a contestatory function and creates a space 
for a discourse of pleasure; in my analysis, by contrast, its target is not 
explicitly a “masculine” linguistic economy but, pace Foucault, a broader 
culture of confession that polices sexuality through disclosure. I contend 
that the narrator critiques the knowledge-power alliance by separating 
confession from the realm of empirical knowledge and challenging the 
Judaeo-Christian moral system to which it is usually attached, operating 
instead in a world in which “love has other laws.”
Rhetorical Seduction
By Grand Central Station’s narrator creates an ars erotica through a con-
fessional discourse of pleasure or, in her words, a “suitable language of 
love” (23) that runs counter to the discourse of knowledge. Avoiding 
biological essentialism, I argue that she does so by way of a methodic-
ally constructed rhetoric rather than through the “ambiguous language” 
that styles itself “as in some sense quintessentially feminine” (Felski 32). 
Shoshana Felman’s concept of the “rhetoric of seduction” (29) provides 
a useful lens in this regard. Drawing on J.L. Austin’s theory of speech 
acts, Felman argues that “The trap of seduction . . . consists in pro-
ducing . . . the illusion of a real or extralinguistic act of commitment 
created by an utterance that refers only to itself” (31). She derives this 
analysis from a close reading of Molière’s Don Juan, whose protagonist 
is so famous for his romantic proclivities as to have become metonymous 
with them. Felman is particularly interested in the role that language 
plays in seduction: Don Juan’s romantic success, she argues, is in fact 
attributable to his rhetorical prowess. His language is “performative 
and not informative; it is a field of enjoyment, not of knowledge. As 
such, it cannot be qualified as true or false, but rather quite specifically 
as felicitous or infelicitous, successful or unsuccessful” (27). Don Juan 
never follows through on the promises that he makes to the women, but 
it does not actually matter whether or not he does so, since this fact is 
external to his project of convincing women of his sincerity.
In By Grand Central Station, the narrator’s confessional rhetoric 
functions in the same manner as Don Juan’s promises. Both protagonists 
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make sustained use of a defined speech act (promising in the latter case 
and confessing in the former case). For both, language operates within 
a “field of enjoyment” rather than of knowledge, and both endeavour 
to persuade rather than inform their audiences. Just as the relationship 
between “the narrator . . . and her poet lover is thoroughly linguistic in 
nature” (McGill 80), so too the relationship between the narrator and 
the reader is one of linguistic luring. Like Don Juan, who seduces by 
making promises with no external referents, the narrator’s confessional 
discourse refers not to empirical reality but to a carefully constructed 
pattern of imagery and rhetoric centred on sensual pleasure: the narra-
tor “repeatedly identifies mythological resonances in her experiences, 
resisting simplistic distinctions between reality and metaphor” (McGill 
81), and presents her world as an erotically charged space, where sensual 
beauty is the chief virtue. Within the larger confessional frame of the 
text, the narrator takes aim at specific instances of institutional confes-
sion, which are representative of restrictive social mores. By positioning 
itself in opposition to these repressive norms, the text works to convince 
the reader to suspend her judgment and instead embrace the celebration 
of pleasure; in other words, it works to “seduce” her into accepting its 
idiosyncratic logic. It is impossible to ascertain the extent to which the 
narrator’s confession is true in any empirical sense, either in the world 
of the text or in relation to the author’s much-discussed autobiography, 
for the terms that the narrator uses are sensual and metaphorical rather 
than factual. Nevertheless, the extent to which her seduction is success-
ful, I would argue, is confirmed by the enduring fascination with the 
novel.
One of the ways that the narrator replaces empirical language with 
the persuasive rhetoric of seduction is by strategically aligning her-
self with intertexts drawn from the literary canon, Greek mythology, 
and, most prominently, the Bible. Her primary source is the Song of 
Solomon, which provides a basis for the fusion of religion and eroticism 
that is a hallmark of her rhetoric.5 The Song of Solomon, or the Song 
of Songs, as it is also known, is a book in the Old Testament written in 
highly poetic language and structured as a dialogue between two lov-
ers. It is singular in both Jewish and Christian traditions for its blatant 
eroticism, which has led many religious exegetes throughout the ages to 
read it allegorically, either as a parable for the relationship between God 
and Israel or Christ and the Church (Hunt 9). Although the allegorical 
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reading persists, contemporary scholars appear to be increasingly com-
fortable accepting its sensuality at face value: one critic goes as far as to 
name it a “Hebrew Kamasutra” (Hunt ix).6 In their poetic address, both 
lovers draw heavily from the natural world to convey their feelings. The 
female interlocutor describes herself as “the rose of Sharon, and the lily 
of the valleys” (Song of Sol. 2.1); her beloved is “unto me as a cluster of 
camphire in the vineyards of Engedi” (1.15); the spring is “the time of 
the singing birds” (2.12). The interpenetration of humans and the natu-
ral world present in the Song of Solomon is clearly a prototype for the 
narrator’s “suitable language of love”: the narrator quotes this text both 
implicitly and directly (“Set me as a seal upon thine heart, as a seal upon 
thine arm, for love is strong as death” [Grand Central Station 44]) in 
the lines of the interrogation scene. One notable example is the repeated 
mention of doves, which in both texts are strongly correlated with the 
lover: in the Song of Solomon, the lover “has dove’s eyes” (1.14) and is 
apostrophized as a “dove that art in the clefts of the rock” (2.14); the 
narrator of By Grand Central Station apostrophizes her lover with the 
identical phrase (48) and later implies his agency when she states that 
her “heart is eaten by a dove” (23). By inscribing her love affair within 
this intertext, the narrator performs several useful rhetorical feats: she 
creates a metaphorical language that deflects the referential demands of 
confession; she gains authority from the scriptural origin of the persona 
that she adopts; she finds a symbolic vocabulary for her erotic experi-
ence; and, perhaps most ingeniously, she grounds her celebration of 
eroticism in scriptural precedent.
The erotically charged physical landscape of the Song of Solomon 
also inspires the setting of By Grand Central Station, whose details are 
metaphorical rather than empirically precise. This setting is correlated 
with “a larger, more permissive and sexually anarchic logic of nature” 
in whose lexicon “[p]ost-coital guilt and repentance have no place” 
rather than with a standard Judaeo-Christian moral framework (Heaps 
153, 154). In the narrator’s erotic geography, nature is personified as a 
“perpetual whore” whose “long days seduce all thoughts away” (Grand 
Central Station 18, 19). The physical environment is rife with danger-
ous temptations: “the kelp in amorous coils” that “appear to pin down 
the Pacific” (19); the hill that “turns from the sea and goes into the 
secrecy and damp air of forbidden things” (21); the enormous trees that 
“forbode disaster by their beauty, built on too grand a scale” (18). This 
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“anarchic logic of nature” is best illustrated in the scene of the narrator’s 
first sexual interaction with her lover “under the waterfall,” after which 
the narrator writes, “Absolve me, I prayed, up through the cathedral red-
woods, and forgive me if this is sin. But the new moss caressed me and 
the water over my feet and the ferns approved me with endearments: My 
darling, my darling, lie down with us now for you also are earth whom 
nothing but love can sow” (24). This passage continues with nature’s 
imagined panegyric to the narrator, a scene later revisited with the addi-
tional detail that “the winds boomed triumph” (34). Nature is both a 
participant in and an adjudicator of the sex act: the diction moves from 
sensuality (“caressed me”) to morality (“approved me”), culminating in 
an apostrophe through which the narrator literally embodies the voice of 
the earth as it gives blessing to the union. This passage continues with a 
description of their sexual encounter as a “confirmation” (25), sustaining 
the motif of the consummated affair as a sacred alliance.
Although the narrator makes use of Christian language, she does 
so only to discard a conventional religious paradigm as an acceptable 
hermeneutic for her love. As in the scene at the border, she parrots the 
diction of an institutional confession (“Absolve me . . .”), in this case a 
religious one, to showcase the incommensurability of her love with its 
strictures. The Christian confession admits fault so as to achieve expia-
tion: a confessor
believes that what he or she did was wrong according to a recog-
nized set of norms, . . . believes that the person to whom he or she is 
confessing also shares those norms, or that the person to whom the 
confession is given is in a position of authority over the confessor 
and that the confessor is aware that his or her confession correlates 
with some type of punishment. (Shuy 4)
Because “guilt and expiation are a desired end,” one only confesses to 
perceived wrongdoings; “one does not confess to getting straight As on 
a report card or to being promoted to vice president, except perhaps 
facetiously” (Shuy 4). The narrator’s account of her sexual “triumph” 
is not facetious, but it is meant to challenge the religious discourse that 
would reduce it to a sin; the narrator does not believe that she is wrong 
or that her implied interlocutor (i.e., the reader) possesses the authority 
to stand in judgment over her. In the place of repentance, the narrator 
prays to God to come down to her level, “to understand my corrupt 
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language and step down for a moment to sit on my broken bench” 
(Grand Central Station 32). In another instance, the narrator mentions 
that she is “unable to assuage my guilt” and implores the “dove in the 
eucalyptus” to tell her “how to atone” (35); however, the apostrophe to 
an imagined interlocutor that is in fact incapable of speech casts doubt 
on any true recognition of wrongdoing. She confirms her unwillingness 
to atone later in the text, as she prepares to return to her parents’ house, 
when she states that she is “[a]sking no one’s forgiveness for sins I refuse 
to recognize” (56). This rhetoric is consistent with the narrator’s refusal 
to furnish “[t]he truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” to 
the border guards (49). In all of these instances, the alternative truth of 
the narrator’s love stands in opposition to the discourse of conventional 
morality and religion, as embodied in the language of institutional con-
fession: the text’s overarching rhetoric of seduction replaces the rhetoric 
of sin and expiation as a viable form of self-expression.
Although the narrator turns her back on the conventional morality 
associated with a religious paradigm, she nevertheless retains a religious 
vocabulary, which she resymbolizes such that sexual love becomes ele-
vated to the highest virtue. When, from her prison cell window, she 
observes a pepper-tree “droop[ing] with green love,” she wonders, “Did 
they see such flagrant proof and still not believe?” (49). The language 
of “belief” points to her transcendent, religious conception of her erotic 
love, as does her classification of those people who are critical of her rela-
tionship — “the leering police thugs,” “Mr Wurtle and his conventional 
pin-pricks,” “the well-meaning matrons” — as a “parade of unbelievers” 
(61). Love is depicted as a kind of pagan religion beyond the power of 
the individual, allied to a more fundamental natural force, and the nar-
rator represents herself as being in direct communion with these primal 
vectors that animate the universe.
If the narrator is “the evangelist preaching a religion of love” 
(Heaps 147), the wife of her lover, by contrast, occupies a different 
religious office: that of sacrificial victim. In one instance, she is the 
“lamb of God” and “the innocent who is always the offering” (Grand 
Central Station 24); in another, she is a martyr to the faith (“Is there 
no other channel of my deliverance except by her martyrdom?” [31]). 
The imagery of sacrifice and martyrdom transforms the wife’s suffering 
from mere collateral damage into a sacred cause: namely, the enabling 
of the narrator’s passionate love. These roles are entrenched through a 
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sustained contrast between the wife’s virginal qualities and the narra-
tor’s flagrant sensuality: the latter’s first glimpse of the wife is expressed 
in synecdoche as her “Madonna eyes, soft as the newly-born, trusting 
as the untempted,” emerge from the bus (17). The imagery oscillates 
throughout this and other passages between the innocence of the child 
and that of the virgin mother and sometimes invokes both: the narrator 
observes the wife “[s]itting nymphlike in the pool,” with her hair falling 
“like sorrow, like mercy, like the mourning-weeds of pity” (23). This 
image contains the dual figuration of the child, here a “nymph,” and 
the religious icon whose anthropomorphized hair forms a kind of pieta, 
adorned as it is with Marian adjectives. Whereas a traditional religious 
framework ascribes virtue to these figures of innocence and chastity, in 
the narrator’s iconography these qualities have subtly negative connota-
tions. The narrator compares the wife to “the flowers that I crush with 
my foot when I walk in the field” (24); if the narrator’s lover is a dove, 
his wife is “as gentle as trusting as tenacious as the birds who rebuild 
their continually violated nests” (23), an image that is revisited in the 
narrator’s admission that “I have broken her heart like a robin’s egg” 
(35). This sense of futility and inconsequence must be contrasted with a 
love as “strong as death” that has been divinely inscribed in the destiny 
of the cosmos, where “Eons have been evolving and planets disintegrat-
ing and forming to compel these two together” (44, 69).
Within her alternative paradigm, the narrator not only opposes the 
power of eroticism to the pettiness of moral scruples but also goes a step 
further in ascribing morality to erotic love. Whereas Foucault speaks of 
the subject’s “moral obligation” in epistemological terms (“to know one-
self, to tell the truth about oneself and to constitute oneself as an object 
of knowledge both for other people and for oneself” [Politics 151]), the 
narrator, by contrast, connects morality with sexual and aesthetic pleas-
ure. Passionate love is a beautiful thing, and therefore, according to the 
narrator’s reasoning, any impediment to the pursuit of her passion is an 
affront to the good. The narrator mobilizes a Kantian rhetoric in sup-
port of her assertion that “there is no beauty in denying love”: “To deny 
love, to deceive it meanly by pretending that what is unconsummated 
remains eternal, or that love sublimated reaches highest heavenly love, is 
repulsive” (Grand Central Station 26). Dante’s Divine Comedy (specific-
ally Paradise) is a clear intertext in its movement from terrestrial love to 
the divine “love that moves the sun and the other stars” (XXXIII.145). 
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However, the narrator of By Grand Central Station rejects the Christian 
teleology: whereas Dante encounters and glorifies figures of chastity, 
the narrator here recasts this image as “repulsive,” positioning against 
it the beauty of terrestrial, sexual love. Kant articulates the connection 
between beauty and morality in the Critique of Judgment, in which he 
writes that “the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good” (par. 59). 
His arguments for this thesis are fourfold: (1) both please “immediately,” 
(2) both please “apart from all interest,” (3) both involve conforming to 
law, and (4) both are seemingly founded on a universal principle (par. 
59). Just as the concept of “justice” is represented by a goddess holding 
scales, so too “morality” finds its symbolic embodiment in things that 
are beautiful (Burnham).7 Kant’s postulate regarding the disinterested-
ness of beauty is particularly salient here: by equating beauty and love, 
the narrator universalizes her actions, suggesting that they obey a prin-
ciple that transcends her individual circumstances. Beauty has its own 
exigencies. A passage from Smart’s diary is instructive in understanding 
the view expounded in the novel:
 Beauty is rare.
 . . . Beauty is not sight or sound. It is a feeling. It is a spirit. It 
permeates through you. It urges you out in a gesture of abandon-
ment or surrender. . . .
 Beauty is holy. Beauty is earthly. It is God. It is sex. It is the 
momentary harmonious union of God with nature. (Necessary 
Secrets 170-71)
For the narrator, “the miracle,” far from the purity of unconsummated 
love, is precisely the power of erotic love to transmute the ordinary into 
the beautiful:
It has happened, the miracle has arrived, everything begins today, 
everything you touch is born; the new moon attended by two 
enormous stars; the sunny day fading with a glow to exhilaration; 
all the paraphernalia of existence, all my sad companions of these 
last twenty years, the pots and pans in Mrs Wurtle’s kitchen, rib-
bons of streets, wilted geraniums, thin children’s legs, all the world 
solicits me with joy, leaps at me electrically, claiming its birth at 
last. (Grand Central Station 40)
The ordinary “paraphernalia of existence” are given a new, cosmic sig-
nificance when touched by the rays of the narrator’s love. Suddenly, 
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they are cast into the light of beauty on a cosmic scale, bathed in the 
“glow” of “two enormous stars.” The aestheticization of the narrator’s 
love becomes a powerful counterargument against two distinct realms 
of moral censure — eroticism and adultery. By reversing the negative 
polarity of these discourses, the narrator reconfigures her erotic, adulter-
ous love as an alternative moral truth engaged in brave resistance against 
the impersonal brutality of the “unbelievers” and their institutions.
The narrator’s Romantic equation of beauty and truth is another 
example of her use of an ars erotica to resist the scientia sexualis enjoined 
by normative social discourse. The narrator leverages beauty against 
the pettiness of moral scruples, locating a more profound truth in the 
“miracle” of transformative love. This is one of several rhetorical moves 
through which she disrupts the knowledge-power alliance produced by 
confessional disclosure; other such strategies, as we have seen, include 
intertextual identification, invoking the “sexually anarchic logic” of 
nature, and stripping Christian iconography of its attendant moral 
system. These discursive strategies constitute a “rhetoric of seduction” 
insofar as they try to entice the reader out of her empirical/moral para-
digms and into the narrator’s sensual world. The success of the narrator’s 
rhetoric, to my mind, is evident in the continuing fascination with both 
the novel and its author: McGill speaks of the “melancholic strategies” 
that readers and critics have employed to transform “the text into a 
memorial to Smart” (84). Their eagerness to give it extratextual life by 
imputing its disclosures to a flesh-and-blood author can be attributed to 
the persuasiveness of a text that creates the “illusion” of intimacy (80). 
The logic of seduction, however, is a logic of deceit: like Don Juan, the 
narrator of By Grand Central Station predicates her language of desire 
on the tempering of knowledge. Although they must be distinguished 
from one another in many respects, Smart and her narrator are identical 
in this regard: the harder we try to know them, the farther they push 
us away.
Notes 
1 In How to Do Things with Words, Austin distinguishes between constative utterances, 
which report facts, and performative utterances, which bring about a certain state of affairs; 
the difference, as he puts it, is between “doing and saying” (47). Confessions have both 
a constative and a performative dimension insofar as they simultaneously relay empirical 
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details and authenticate the narrative being relayed. For a more extensive discussion of the 
performative dimension of confession, see Shuy.
2 Mrs. Witchie is a family friend whose son makes an appearance in By Grand Central 
Station as Mr. Wurtle; George had been jailed brief ly in wartime Montreal for failing to 
produce identity papers (van Wart in Smart, Necessary Secrets 284n3); Hull, in Smart’s 
words, is a “sleazy town across the Ottawa river” where George had to “skulk” because 
Smart’s mother “refused to have him in the house” (Autobiographies 48).
3 This statement was later revealed to be false when it came to light that the novel was 
written over three years, a fact that confirms Smart’s biographical ambiguity (McGill 72).
4 Foucault associates ars erotica with historical, largely non-Western societies such as 
“China, Japan, India, Rome, [and] the Arabo-Moslem societies” (History 57).
5 So sustained is this intertext throughout the novel that one is almost tempted to 
call it a “hypotext” (Genette 11). A “hypo/hypertext,” according to Gérard Genette, is 
a more sustained form of intertextuality in which one text is actually a transformation of 
another text rather than simply marked by isolated allusions (11). By Grand Central Station 
is deeply indebted to the Song of Solomon in more ways than I have space to discuss here. 
Nevertheless, to my mind, it is a stretch to describe Smart’s novel as a “hypertext” given 
the prevalence and reoccurrence of other intertexts, including the reference to Psalm 137, 
from which it derives its title.
6 Germane to this discussion is the notable detail that it is uncertain whether the lovers 
at the centre of the text are in fact married (though “pious exegetes of the synagogue and 
church” were apparently insistent that they be regarded as such [Hunt 3]).
7 For proof of this statement in our own culture, one need only consider the iconog-
raphy of the Disney film, in which virtuous princesses are beautiful and villains are inevit-
ably ugly. See Umberto Eco’s On Ugliness for a more sustained discussion of this topic.
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